Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Fine-grained, logic, philosophy: statements can be be more or less detailed. E.g. the fine-grained statement (x)(y)(x = y > (N(x = x) > N(x = y))) could be displayed in a coarse-grained way as A > B. For the decision of problems the coarse-grained form is often inadequate. See also decidability, possible worlds, situation semantics, possible world semantics, hyperintensionality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Fine-grained/ coarse-grained - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 167 Fine-grained/Fodor/Lepore: for Frege's distinction intension/extension individuation must be finer than the individuation of extensions (> evening star/morning star). Putname: for the twin earth it must not be as fine as the orthography: otherwise "unmarried man" is unequal "bachelor" (> narrow content/wide content). IV 169 Fine-grained/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. as fine as orthography: then not only evening star/morning star can be distinguished, but also unmarried man/bachelor ((s) other than distinguishing object language/metalanguage). Frege: needs a more fine-grained distinction. (> intension/extension). Putnam: twin earth requires less fine-grained. Closely synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different, e.g. water/twin earth water. >Twin Earth._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Fine-grained/ coarse-grained
